---
title: "Cloud security issues: the real risks and how to fix them"
description: "Cloud security issues are weaknesses in how cloud services, identities, applications, and data are configured and managed."
published: "2026-10-09T16:00:00.000Z"
updated: "2026-10-09T16:00:00.000Z"
url: "https://getdosya.com/cloud-security-issues-the-real-risks-and-how-to-fix-them"
canonical: "https://getdosya.com/cloud-security-issues-the-real-risks-and-how-to-fix-them"
site: "Get dosya"
---

# Cloud security issues: the real risks and how to fix them

Cloud security issues are weaknesses in how cloud services, identities, applications, and data are configured and managed.

## Key takeaways

- Cloud providers secure the underlying infrastructure, but customers keep responsibilities that vary by service, such as access, configuration, and data handling.
- Block public access to storage unless a documented business need exists, and scan infrastructure definitions before deployment to catch misconfigurations early.
- Prefer provider-managed workload identities over static credentials, keep other secrets in a secrets manager, and scan code for exposed secrets.
- Prioritize fixes by exposure, exploitability, permissions, and data sensitivity together, then start with one business-critical workload and verify each fix works.

Cloud security issues are weaknesses in how cloud services, identities, applications, and data are configured and managed. Addressing them means combining clear ownership with access controls, secure deployment, monitoring, and tested recovery—not simply trusting the provider to handle everything. This guide explains the practical risks and how to build defenses around them. ([media.defense.gov](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Mar/07/2003407860/-1/-1/0/CSI-CloudTop10-Mitigation-Strategies.PDF))

## What are cloud computing security risks?

Cloud computing security risks are conditions that could let someone access information without permission, change or destroy resources, or interrupt services. They include compromised identities, exposed storage, vulnerable applications, and gaps between provider responsibilities and customer responsibilities. These risks affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability, so protecting cloud systems requires more than preventing data theft. ([media.defense.gov](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Mar/07/2003407860/-1/-1/0/CSI-CloudTop10-Mitigation-Strategies.PDF))

A useful distinction is between a threat and a weakness. An attacker using stolen credentials is a threat; an account with excessive permissions is a weakness that increases the damage those credentials can cause. Assessing both helps you decide what to fix rather than treating every alert as equally urgent. ([cheatsheetseries.owasp.org](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authorization_Cheat_Sheet.html))

### Shared responsibility defines your security workload

Cloud providers secure underlying infrastructure, but customers retain responsibilities that vary by service. With infrastructure as a service, your team generally manages operating systems, applications, access, and configuration. Managed platforms transfer more technical work to the provider, while software as a service still leaves you responsible for areas such as user access, data handling, and sharing settings. ([learn.microsoft.com](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/shared-responsibility))

Create a responsibility record for each important service. Identify who configures authentication, reviews permissions, enables logging, patches customer-managed components, and restores data. Use the provider’s service-specific documentation rather than assuming one responsibility model covers every product. ([ncsc.gov.uk](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cloud/understanding-cloud-services/cloud-security-shared-responsibility-model))

## Which cloud security threats need attention first?

Cloud security threats deserve priority when they combine an accessible entry point with powerful permissions or valuable data. Exposed resources, compromised administrator accounts, and vulnerable internet-facing applications therefore need close attention. Your actual order should reflect the environment: a publicly readable customer database may be more urgent than a severe vulnerability on an isolated test machine. ([media.defense.gov](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Mar/07/2003407860/-1/-1/0/CSI-CloudTop10-Mitigation-Strategies.PDF))

### Misconfiguration and accidental exposure

A storage container intended for internal documents can become publicly accessible through an incorrect policy. Similarly, a permissive network rule can expose administrative interfaces or databases. These are configuration problems, not necessarily failures in the provider’s infrastructure. ([media.defense.gov](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Mar/07/2003407860/-1/-1/0/CSI-CloudTop10-Mitigation-Strategies.PDF))

**How to fix it:** Block public access unless there is a documented business requirement. Restrict network paths to necessary sources and services, and check the effective permissions of sensitive storage. Scan infrastructure definitions before deployment, then monitor live resources for changes that move them away from approved settings. ([docs.aws.amazon.com](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/prescriptive-guidance/latest/terraform-aws-provider-best-practices/security.html))

### Stolen identities and excessive permissions

An attacker does not always need a software exploit. A compromised account or exposed credential can provide access through legitimate interfaces. Broad permissions make the situation worse by allowing one compromised identity to reach unrelated resources. ([media.defense.gov](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Mar/07/2003407860/-1/-1/0/CSI-CloudTop10-Mitigation-Strategies.PDF))

**How to fix it:** Require multifactor authentication, use centralized sign-in where appropriate, and reserve highly privileged accounts for exceptional tasks. Assign permissions around actual duties rather than convenience. Review access when people join, change roles, or leave, and give automated workloads their own narrowly scoped identities. ([ncsc.gov.uk](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cloud/using-cloud-services-securely/using-a-cloud-platform-securely))

### Insecure APIs and vulnerable applications

Cloud hosting does not repair application authorization flaws. An API might authenticate a user correctly but still return another customer’s records because it fails to check access to the requested object. Internet-accessible management endpoints introduce additional exposure. ([cheatsheetseries.owasp.org](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/REST_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html))

**How to fix it:** Check authorization at every protected endpoint and for every requested resource. Validate inputs, require HTTPS, restrict administrative interfaces, and apply appropriate request limits. Include tests that attempt to access another user’s records; a successful login is not proof that access controls work. ([cheatsheetseries.owasp.org](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/REST_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html))

### Exposed secrets and deployment weaknesses

Deployment pipelines need access to powerful systems, which makes their credentials and configuration important security boundaries. Secrets embedded in source code or deployment files can turn an ordinary development mistake into unauthorized cloud access. Unreviewed infrastructure changes can also reproduce insecure settings across environments. ([media.defense.gov](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Mar/07/2003407860/-1/-1/0/CSI-CloudTop10-Mitigation-Strategies.PDF))

**How to fix it:** Prefer provider-managed workload identities over static credentials where supported. Otherwise, keep credentials in a secrets manager and limit who or what can retrieve them. Scan code and infrastructure for exposed secrets, review deployment changes, and restrict production deployment permissions. ([ncsc.gov.uk](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cloud/using-cloud-services-securely/using-a-cloud-platform-securely))

### Ransomware, deletion, and service disruption

Cloud data can still be deleted, corrupted, or held for ransom. Provider resilience does not guarantee that your application can recover from a compromised administrator or destructive configuration change. Backups also need protection against the identities that control production. ([media.defense.gov](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Mar/07/2003407860/-1/-1/0/CSI-CloudTop10-Mitigation-Strategies.PDF))

**How to fix it:** Use versioning, deletion safeguards, and immutable backups where appropriate. Separate backup administration from everyday production access, and test restoration rather than relying on successful backup notifications. Design availability around business needs and verify failover behavior before depending on it during an outage. ([docs.aws.amazon.com](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/pdfs/prescriptive-guidance/latest/security-best-practices/security-best-practices.pdf))

### Unmonitored activity and third-party access

Without suitable logs, unauthorized changes can be difficult to investigate. Third-party integrations and service providers introduce additional identities and permissions that need oversight. Access granted during setup should not become an unexplained permanent exception. ([media.defense.gov](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Mar/07/2003407860/-1/-1/0/CSI-CloudTop10-Mitigation-Strategies.PDF))

**How to fix it:** Centralize audit logs, protect them from modification, and verify that important accounts and services actually send events. Review vendor permissions and remove access that is no longer needed. Give alerts a named responder and a documented investigation path. ([docs.aws.amazon.com](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/best-practices-security.html))

## Cloud data protection beyond encryption

Effective cloud data protection starts with understanding what information you hold, where it resides, and who can use it. Encryption matters, but it belongs alongside classification, access restrictions, retention decisions, and recovery controls. Treating encryption as the complete strategy leaves those other responsibilities unresolved. ([learn.microsoft.com](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/shared-responsibility))

### Match safeguards to the information

Build a practical inventory of sensitive stores, including databases, object storage, exports, logs, and backups. Assign an owner who can explain why the information exists and what access is necessary. Use that understanding to decide which resources need stronger restrictions and which copies should no longer be retained. ([media.defense.gov](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Mar/07/2003407860/-1/-1/0/CSI-CloudTop10-Mitigation-Strategies.PDF))

For each important dataset, record:

- **Purpose and sensitivity:** What the information supports and what harm exposure could cause.
- **Location and copies:** Where primary data, exports, backups, and replicas reside.
- **Access:** Which people, workloads, and external organizations can read or change it.
- **Lifecycle:** How long it is needed and how deletion will be handled.
- **Recovery:** Which protection mechanisms exist and how restoration is verified. ([learn.microsoft.com](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/shared-responsibility))

### Protect encryption keys and review provider terms

Encrypt sensitive information in transit and at rest, and understand who controls the keys. Key management needs its own access restrictions and recovery considerations; losing access to necessary keys can make protected data unusable. Choose the model that fits your needs rather than assuming customer-managed keys automatically solve every security problem. ([media.defense.gov](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Mar/07/2003407860/-1/-1/0/CSI-CloudTop10-Mitigation-Strategies.PDF))

Review provider terms for data use, storage locations, deletion, and availability. Check that independent assurance covers the service and deployment you actually use. Where contractual or regulatory obligations apply, have the appropriate specialists assess them rather than treating a provider certification as approval for every workload. ([ncsc.gov.uk](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cloud/the-cloud-security-principles/principle-2-asset-protection-and-resilience))

## Cloud security best practices that scale

The goal is to make secure operation repeatable. Approved configurations, automated checks, and clear ownership help teams deploy without reconstructing security decisions each time. Cloud-native managed services can reduce some operational work, but they still need configuration and oversight appropriate to the workload. ([ncsc.gov.uk](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cloud/using-cloud-services-securely/using-a-cloud-platform-securely))

### Build secure defaults into delivery

Use reviewed infrastructure templates for recurring requirements such as restricted networking, logging, encryption, and role definitions. Scan proposed changes before deployment and inspect deployed resources afterward. Infrastructure as code supports consistency, but an insecure template can consistently deploy the wrong settings. ([docs.aws.amazon.com](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/prescriptive-guidance/latest/terraform-aws-provider-best-practices/security.html))

Separate development, testing, and production where appropriate, with permissions that prevent routine development work from changing production resources. Keep exceptions visible: record the owner, business reason, compensating safeguards, and review point. This provides a more useful operating model than undocumented manual changes. ([cheatsheetseries.owasp.org](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Secure_Cloud_Architecture_Cheat_Sheet.html))

### Make detection actionable

Collect identity, administrative, application, and relevant data-access events according to your investigation needs. Centralized storage should have restricted access and safeguards against tampering. Confirm coverage explicitly; having a logging service available does not mean every useful event is recorded. ([docs.aws.amazon.com](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/best-practices-security.html))

Start with alerts tied to decisions: unexpected privilege changes, disabled logging, newly exposed resources, or suspicious authentication. For each alert, define what the responder should verify and which containment actions they may take. Test the route from event generation to human response so a technically correct alert does not end in an unattended queue. ([ncsc.gov.uk](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cloud/using-cloud-services-securely/using-a-cloud-platform-securely))

## How should you prioritize cloud security fixes?

Prioritize cloud security fixes by considering exposure, exploitability, permissions, data sensitivity, and business impact together. A finding becomes more important when it creates a credible path from initial access to damaging action. Severity ratings are useful inputs, but they should not replace context about the affected workload. ([cheatsheetseries.owasp.org](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Secure_Cloud_Architecture_Cheat_Sheet.html))

Use this sequence as a planning framework, adjusting it to the evidence in your environment:

1. **Identify critical assets and owners.** Map sensitive data, essential services, privileged identities, and recovery dependencies.
2. **Close dangerous entry points.** Investigate exposed sensitive storage, unnecessary public administration interfaces, and leaked credentials.
3. **Reduce potential damage.** Remove unnecessary permissions, separate environments, and restrict access between workloads.
4. **Verify visibility and recovery.** Confirm logging coverage, alert ownership, backup protection, and successful restoration.
5. **Prevent recurrence.** Update templates, access processes, deployment checks, and exception records so the same weakness is less likely to return. ([media.defense.gov](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Mar/07/2003407860/-1/-1/0/CSI-CloudTop10-Mitigation-Strategies.PDF))

For example, imagine a public application running with permission to read every production storage container. Patching the application matters, but narrowing its identity permissions also reduces what an attacker could reach if a different flaw is exploited later. Considering the whole path produces a stronger fix than closing one finding in isolation. ([cheatsheetseries.owasp.org](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Secure_Cloud_Architecture_Cheat_Sheet.html))

## Make security an operating habit

The security risks of cloud computing are best managed through ongoing ownership, not a one-time review. Revisit permissions as roles change, inspect configuration as services evolve, and repeat recovery tests as applications gain dependencies. These practices keep security aligned with the system you actually operate. ([media.defense.gov](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Mar/07/2003407860/-1/-1/0/CSI-CloudTop10-Mitigation-Strategies.PDF))

Start with one business-critical workload and work through its identities, data, exposure, logs, and recovery process. Document the gaps, assign owners, and verify that each fix works before moving on. That gives cloud security challenges a manageable scope while building a repeatable approach for the wider environment.

## Related guides

- [Encrypted messages: what end-to-end really protects](/encrypted-messages-what-end-to-end-really-protects)
- [ISO 27001 vs NIST CSF: which framework to follow](/iso-27001-vs-nist-csf-which-framework-to-follow)

## Sources

1. [media.defense.gov: CSI CloudTop10 Mitigation Strategies.PDF](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Mar/07/2003407860/-1/-1/0/CSI-CloudTop10-Mitigation-Strategies.PDF)
2. [Authorization - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authorization_Cheat_Sheet.html)
3. [Shared responsibility in the cloud - Microsoft Azure | Microsoft Learn](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/shared-responsibility)
4. [Cloud security guidance | Understanding cloud services | Cloud security shared responsibility model | National Cyber Security Centre](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cloud/understanding-cloud-services/cloud-security-shared-responsibility-model)
5. [Security best practices - AWS Prescriptive Guidance](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/prescriptive-guidance/latest/terraform-aws-provider-best-practices/security.html)
6. [Cloud security guidance | Using cloud services securely | Using a cloud platform securely | National Cyber Security Centre](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cloud/using-cloud-services-securely/using-a-cloud-platform-securely)
7. [REST Security - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/REST_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html)
8. [docs.aws.amazon.com: Security best practices](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/pdfs/prescriptive-guidance/latest/security-best-practices/security-best-practices.pdf)
9. [Security best practices in AWS CloudTrail - AWS CloudTrail](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/best-practices-security.html)
10. [Cloud security guidance | The cloud security principles | Principle 2: Asset protection and resilience | National Cyber Security Centre](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cloud/the-cloud-security-principles/principle-2-asset-protection-and-resilience)
11. [Secure Cloud Architecture - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Secure_Cloud_Architecture_Cheat_Sheet.html)
