---
title: "SHA-1 vs SHA-256: why SHA-1 is retired"
description: "SHA-1 and SHA-256 are cryptographic hash functions, but SHA-1 is no longer suitable for security decisions that depend on collision resistance."
published: "2026-10-15T14:00:00.000Z"
updated: "2026-10-15T14:00:00.000Z"
url: "https://getdosya.com/sha-1-vs-sha-256-why-sha-1-is-retired"
canonical: "https://getdosya.com/sha-1-vs-sha-256-why-sha-1-is-retired"
site: "Get dosya"
---

# SHA-1 vs SHA-256: why SHA-1 is retired

SHA-1 and SHA-256 are cryptographic hash functions, but SHA-1 is no longer suitable for security decisions that depend on collision resistance.

## Key takeaways

- SHA-1 gives a 160-bit digest and SHA-256 a 256-bit one, and SHA-1 is retired because researchers showed different inputs can share a digest.
- NIST deprecated SHA-1 in 2011, disallowed it for digital signatures at the end of 2013, and plans to end its use by December 31, 2030.
- Do not store passwords with a single SHA-256 operation, and use a dedicated scheme such as Argon2id or properly configured PBKDF2 with salts instead.
- MongoDB has defaulted to SCRAM-SHA-256 since Server 4.0, but changing the client setting alone cannot create missing server-side credentials, and TLS is still required.

SHA-1 and SHA-256 are cryptographic hash functions, but SHA-1 is no longer suitable for security decisions that depend on collision resistance. SHA-256 belongs to the SHA-2 family, which NIST recommends as an alternative as organizations move away from SHA-1. This comparison explains the security difference, what retirement means, and how those choices affect MongoDB SCRAM authentication. ([csrc.nist.gov](https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/hash-functions?trk=article-ssr-frontend-pulse_little-text-block))

## What is the difference between SHA-1 and SHA-256?

The main difference is security: SHA-1 has demonstrated collision weaknesses, while SHA-256 is a recommended replacement for applications requiring collision resistance. Their outputs also differ: SHA-1 produces a 160-bit digest, and SHA-256 produces a 256-bit digest. The choice is therefore about more than getting a longer fingerprint; it is about whether that fingerprint remains trustworthy against deliberate manipulation. ([csrc.nist.gov](https://csrc.nist.gov/news/2017/research-results-on-sha-1-collisions))

A **cryptographic hash** maps input data to a fixed-length digest. Hashing the same bytes with the same algorithm produces the same result, while changing the input should produce a different digest with very high probability. Hashing is not encryption: there is no decryption key that restores the original document or message. ([csrc.nist.gov](https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/fips/180-4/final/docs/fips180-4.pdf))

| Property | SHA-1 | SHA-256 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Algorithm family | SHA-1 | SHA-2 |
| Digest length | 160 bits | 256 bits |
| Hexadecimal representation | 40 characters | 64 characters |
| Collision-resistance status | Demonstrably weakened | Recommended alternative |
| New security-sensitive deployments | Avoid | Use where appropriate to the protocol |

These output properties come from the Secure Hash Standard; the deployment distinction follows NIST’s transition guidance. A larger digest alone does not establish security, but SHA-256 combines a larger output with a design that remains recommended for cryptographic protection. ([csrc.nist.gov](https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/fips/180-4/final/docs/fips180-4.pdf))

Whether written as **SHA-256 vs SHA-1**, **SHA-1 vs 256**, or **SHA-1 vs SHA-256**, the practical comparison is the same: prefer SHA-256 for new uses that would otherwise rely on SHA-1’s security properties. ([csrc.nist.gov](https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Hash-Functions/NIST-Policy-on-Hash-Functions))

## Why is SHA-1 retired?

SHA-1 is retired from collision-sensitive security uses because researchers demonstrated that different inputs can deliberately produce the same SHA-1 digest. That breaks a property needed when hashes help establish document integrity or support digital signatures. Retirement is a staged transition, however—not a claim that every SHA-1-based system fails in exactly the same way. ([csrc.nist.gov](https://csrc.nist.gov/news/2017/research-results-on-sha-1-collisions))

### Collision attacks undermine trust

A collision occurs when two different inputs share one digest. In February 2017, Google and CWI researchers publicly demonstrated this with two different PDF files that produced the same SHA-1 hash. The result turned a long-standing security concern into a concrete example that developers could reproduce. ([security.googleblog.com](https://security.googleblog.com/2017/02/announcing-first-sha1-collision.html?hl=hi))

Consider a workflow that signs a document’s digest rather than the entire document directly. If an attacker can arrange two suitable documents with the same digest, the hash no longer reliably distinguishes the intended content from its substitute. The exact exploit depends on the workflow and attacker control, but the foundational collision-resistance assumption has failed. ([csrc.nist.gov](https://csrc.nist.gov/news/2017/research-results-on-sha-1-collisions))

A collision attack is not the same as recovering an arbitrary password or finding an input for any chosen hash. Those are different security problems, with different implications. Keeping that distinction clear prevents both understating SHA-1’s problems and exaggerating what a collision demonstration proves. ([rfc-editor.org](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6194.txt))

### Retirement happens in stages

NIST deprecated SHA-1 in 2011 and disallowed it for generating digital signatures at the end of 2013. Its broader transition plan calls for moving away from SHA-1 for applying cryptographic protection across all applications by **December 31, 2030**. That date is a transition endpoint, not a reason to postpone replacing collision-sensitive uses. ([csrc.nist.gov](https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/hash-functions?trk=article-ssr-frontend-pulse_little-text-block))

Historical verification is a separate concern. NIST notes that handling information protected before the transition endpoint may still require SHA-1 afterward. A sensible retirement plan therefore separates creating new protection from accessing or verifying older records. ([nist.gov](https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2022/12/nist-transitioning-away-sha-1-all-applications))

## SHA-256 still needs the right construction

Choosing SHA-256 does not automatically make a system secure. A hash is one component, and the surrounding construction determines what it protects. For example, checking file integrity, authenticating a message, and storing passwords require different safeguards. ([csrc.nist.gov](https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/fips/180-4/final/docs/fips180-4.pdf))

Match the mechanism to the job:

- **File integrity:** Compare the digest against a trusted reference. A matching value is useful only when the reference itself is trustworthy. ([csrc.nist.gov](https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/fips/180-4/final/docs/fips180-4.pdf))
- **Message authentication:** Use a standard keyed construction such as HMAC rather than treating a plain digest as proof of who sent a message. ([rfc-editor.org](https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104/))
- **Password storage:** Use a dedicated password-hashing scheme such as Argon2id or appropriately configured PBKDF2, not a single SHA-256 operation. Fast hashes allow rapid password guessing. ([cheatsheetseries.owasp.org](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html))
- **Digital signatures:** Follow the signature protocol’s supported algorithm combinations rather than changing a hash name independently. Collision resistance matters, but it is not the entire signature system. ([csrc.nist.gov](https://csrc.nist.gov/news/2017/research-results-on-sha-1-collisions))

For application passwords, the distinction is especially important: replacing plain SHA-1 with plain SHA-256 still leaves a fast password verifier. Password protection needs salts and an appropriate work factor, not just a stronger general-purpose hash. ([cheatsheetseries.owasp.org](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html))

## How does SCRAM-SHA-1 vs SCRAM-SHA-256 affect MongoDB?

For MongoDB, SCRAM-SHA-256 is the preferred direction when clients and user credentials support it. Both mechanisms belong to the Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism family; SHA-256 replaces SHA-1 within the protocol’s hashing and HMAC operations. This is an authentication-protocol comparison, not simply a comparison of two raw password hashes. ([rfc-editor.org](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7677.txt))

In a **MongoDB SCRAM-SHA-1 vs SCRAM-SHA-256** evaluation, compatibility and credential configuration matter alongside algorithm choice. MongoDB’s SCRAM implementation provides per-user random salts, a tunable iteration count, and mutual authentication between client and server. MongoDB documentation identifies SCRAM-SHA-256 as the default authentication mechanism starting with Server 4.0. ([mongodb.com](https://www.mongodb.com/docs/manual/core/security-scram/))

### Collision weaknesses do not equal an automatic login bypass

SCRAM uses a structured challenge-response exchange and password-derived material. The known SHA-1 collision problem does not, by itself, demonstrate that an attacker can authenticate as any MongoDB user. RFC 7677 nevertheless introduces SHA-256-based SCRAM for stronger security properties and greater expected longevity. ([rfc-editor.org](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5802.txt))

### Credentials and transport need attention

An existing user may not have credentials for every supported mechanism. MongoDB’s self-managed user-update documentation distinguishes retaining existing mechanisms from generating new credentials when a password is supplied. Switching a client’s authMechanism setting alone cannot create missing server-side credentials. ([mongodb.com](https://www.mongodb.com/docs/manual/reference/method/db.updateuser/))

Use TLS during credential administration and normal database connections. SCRAM does not replace transport encryption, and MongoDB specifically warns that user-update operations can expose passwords in transit without TLS. Follow the credential-management process appropriate to your deployment rather than copying self-managed commands into an incompatible environment. ([rfc-editor.org](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5802.txt))

## Build a migration plan around each use

Treat migration as a dependency change, not a search-and-replace exercise. Start with the purpose of each SHA-1 reference, then identify what must change together. Keep historical verification needs separate from new security operations, consistent with NIST’s transition guidance. ([nist.gov](https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2022/12/nist-transitioning-away-sha-1-all-applications))

A practical checklist:

1. **Inventory references.** Review application code, signing configurations, authentication settings, integrations, and stored digest fields. Assign an owner to each dependency.
2. **Classify the purpose.** Separate document hashing, signatures, HMAC, password derivation, and legacy verification. Do not assume they share one migration procedure.
3. **Check dependencies first.** Identify clients, tools, and integrations that must be tested before removing an older mechanism.
4. **Test representative workflows.** Include scheduled jobs, administrative access, credential rotation, backups, and recovery procedures—not just the main application login.
5. **Define completion.** Record the replacement, rollout checks, rollback conditions, and any narrowly scoped legacy exception.

For MongoDB, add an explicit credential check before enforcing SCRAM-SHA-256. Confirm that the intended users have suitable credentials and that every required client can authenticate. Test through the actual application configuration, including its authentication database and mechanism settings. ([mongodb.com](https://www.mongodb.com/docs/manual/core/security-scram/))

Avoid turning temporary compatibility into permanent policy. Give each exception an owner, a reason, and a review date, then track its removal alongside the technical rollout.

## The takeaway

SHA-1’s retirement reflects a demonstrated failure of collision resistance, not merely its age or shorter digest. SHA-256 is the stronger replacement for appropriate hash-based uses, while MongoDB deployments should plan toward SCRAM-SHA-256 without overlooking credentials, client compatibility, or TLS. Choose the right construction, test the full workflow, and retire legacy dependencies deliberately. ([csrc.nist.gov](https://csrc.nist.gov/news/2017/research-results-on-sha-1-collisions))

## Related guides

- [SAML vs SSO: what is the difference?](/saml-vs-sso-what-is-the-difference)
- [What is PII? Personal data explained](/what-is-pii-personal-data-explained)

## Sources

1. [Hash Functions | CSRC](https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/hash-functions?trk=article-ssr-frontend-pulse_little-text-block)
2. [Research Results on SHA-1 Collisions | CSRC](https://csrc.nist.gov/news/2017/research-results-on-sha-1-collisions)
3. [csrc.nist.gov: Fips180 4](https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/fips/180-4/final/docs/fips180-4.pdf)
4. [Hash Functions | CSRC](https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Hash-Functions/NIST-Policy-on-Hash-Functions)
5. [Google Online Security Blog: Announcing the first SHA1 collision](https://security.googleblog.com/2017/02/announcing-first-sha1-collision.html?hl=hi)
6. [rfc-editor.org: Rfc6194.txt](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6194.txt)
7. [NIST Transitioning Away from SHA-1 for All Applications | NIST](https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2022/12/nist-transitioning-away-sha-1-all-applications)
8. [RFC 2104: HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication | RFC Editor](https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104/)
9. [Password Storage - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html)
10. [rfc-editor.org: Rfc7677.txt](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7677.txt)
11. [SCRAM - Database Manual - MongoDB Docs](https://www.mongodb.com/docs/manual/core/security-scram/)
12. [rfc-editor.org: Rfc5802.txt](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5802.txt)
13. [Database Manual - MongoDB Docs](https://www.mongodb.com/docs/manual/reference/method/db.updateuser/)
